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NOTES
Guo Chun Di v. Carroll: The Refugee Status
of Chinese Nationals Fleeing Persecution
Resulting from China's Coercive Population
Control Measures
I. Introduction
In the late 1970's, during a meeting with Chinese leaders, President
Carter pressed his counterparts to lift China's restrictions on emigra-
tion. Without blinking an eye, the Chinese officials asked Carter how
many million immigrants the United States might like. Carter diplo-
matically steered the discussion in less volatile directions.]
The history of the U.S. immigration policy toward Chinese nation-
als is replete with inconsistencies that reveal the conflicting tensions
inherent in U.S. immigration policy in general. In refugee law, these
tensions arise when the humanitarian impulse confronts the realities
of domestic and foreign policy agendas.
The first Chinese to immigrate to the United States were wel-
comed with curiosity and respect. 2 Immigration had been almost un-
restricted in America as the new nation quickly expanded westward. 3
However, by the 1860s America's attitude toward Chinese immigrants
had soured. 4 Unlike the European immigrants that flooded into the
United States from the East, the Chinese were thought to be inassimil-
able.5 In 1882 Congress enacted the first Chinese Exclusion Act (Ex-
clusion Act), which suspended immigration of Chinese, with minor
I Bruce Stokes, Millions On The Move, 23 NAT'LJ. 2850, 2850 (1991).
2 "In 1852 the governor of California claimed he wanted 'further immigration and
settlement of the Chinese - one of the worthy classes of our newly adopted citizens.' " Harold
Hongju Koh, Bitter Fruit of the Asian Immigration Cases, reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. S569, S569
(daily ed. Jan. 6, 1995).
3 SeeJOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE STRANGE LAND: PATrERNS OF AMERICAN NATMSM
8 (1988).
4 Id. "White workers assailed the Chinese for working too hard for too little, while the
popular press vilified them as lairs [sic], criminals, prostitutes and opium addicts." Id
5 Id. Justice Stephen Field wrote:
[T] hey remained strangers in the land, residing apart from themselves, and
adhering to the customs and usages of their own country .... As they grew in
numbers each year the people of the [West] Coast saw, or believed they saw...
great danger that at no distant day that portion of our country would be over-
run by them unless prompt action was taken to restrict their immigration.
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889).
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exceptions, for the next sixty years. 6
The political backlash toward free flowing immigration evidenced
by enactment of the Exclusion Act was typical of the "inherent tension
that runs through all political and legal decision making on refugee
and asylum questions in the United States. The notion of refugee in-
vokes sympathy. The possibility of resulting privileges, especially a po-
tential right to resettle indefinitely, evokes suspicion that the unworthy
are trying to claim that.status."7 As one commentator noted: "Histori-
cally, the United States has led the world in willingness to admit immi-
grants. Yet for at least one hundred years that willingness has
competed with widespread public sentiment in favor of limiting immi-
gration flow."8 Immigration law has thus had to contend with these
conflicting domestic attitudes toward the influx of immigrants to this
country.
Refugee law in particular has had the additional handicap of de-
veloping against the backdrop of cold war politics. 9 The adoption of
the Refugee Act of 198010 (Act) first introduced to American law a
prospective, nonideological framework for refugee admissions."
6 22 Stat. 58-60, 214 (1882). This statute and its progeny set the stage for Ping v. United
States, the landmark Chinese Exclusion Case that established the plenary power of Congress
and of the federal government over immigration. Ping, 130 U.S. at 609. Justice Field for the
first time found the unrestricted power to control the nation's borders to be inherent in
national sovereignty, both because the sovereignty would be diminished to the extent the
government lacked exclusive jurisdiction over its own territory, and because such a power is
necessary to guarantee the nation's security. Id. at 603-04.
7 THOMAS ALEINKOFF & DAVID MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 616 (1985);
see also GERASSIMos FouRLANOS, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE INGRESS OF ALIENS 120 (1986) (charac-
terizing such tension as a "competition of principles; on the one hand sovereignty and its
related concepts (territorial supremacy, self-defense, self-preservation) and, on the other
hand, humanitarian principles deriving from both general international law and from
treaties").
8 John Scanlan, RegulatingRefugeeFlow: LegalAlternatives and Obligations Under The Refu-
gee Act of 1980, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 618, 619 (1981). This tension is illustrated in the
debates culminating in the passage of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104
Stat. 4978 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). For example, Senator Alan Simpson
stated that the United States should accept "the hideous reality that there are many more
people who want to come here than there is room or intent to accommodate them." 1989
CONG. Q. WEEKLY R'EP. 1785, 1786. Conversely, Senator Edward Kennedy stated that "[w]e
can't afford to put a sign on the Statue of Liberty that says, 'No Vacancy.' " Id. at 1785.
9 Since World War II, the United States has admitted hundreds of thousands of refu-
gees. DAVID CARLINER ET AL.., THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS AND REFUGEES 46 (1990). As early as
1969, Senator Kennedy complained that the definition of a refugee remained rooted in a
"cold war framework." 115 CONG. REc. 36,966 (1969). Refugees from countries hostile to
the United States have invariably been accorded asylum while equally worthy persons fleeing
friendly countries have met with far less success. Ira Kurzban, A Critical Analysis of Refugee
Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REv. 865 (1982).
10 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.). See generally Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legisla-
tive Histopy of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 9 (1981).
11 "Refugee" is defined under the Act as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality.., who is
unable to or unwilling to return to, and is unwilling or unable to avail himself
or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
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Nonetheless, the Act's implementation by the Executive Branch has
allowed the intrusion of party politics and foreign relations objectives
into asylum law to continue.' 2
In Guo Chun Di v. Carroll,13 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia granted a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus to a Chinese national who had been denied asylum based on
his claim that he feared persecution because of his opposition to the
People's Republic of China's (PRC) coercive population control prac-
tices. 14 In arriving at its decision, the court was forced to grapple with
the "cacophony of administrative voices" reflecting the political "flip-
flopping" that has characterized this area of refugee law.' 5 The court
in Guo Chun Di abandoned this deluge of conflicting agendas in favor
of what it determined to be the result warranted by the plain meaning
of the Act.16
Part II of this note presents the facts, procedural history and hold-
ing of Guo Chun Di v. CarrolL'7 In Part III, the note relates the applica-
ble background law, including the Refugee Act of 1980 and its
application to the issue of Chinese nationals fleeing that country's co-
ercive family planning measures.' 8 Then, in Part IV, the note analyzes
the holding in Guo Chun Di in light of decisions by the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals (BIA or Board) and the decisions of Article III courts.
The note explains that the court's decision in Guo Chun Di, while con-
trary to contemporaneous decisions by other courts, is consistent with
controlling precedent, as well as a faithful interpretation of the Act. 19
Finally, in Part V, this note concludes that the court's ruling in Guo
Chun Di is significant both for its contribution to legal jurisprudence
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (A) (1988). See S. REP. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980) (stat-
ing that the refugee definition is based on an ideological and geographically neutral defini-
tion); H.R REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 9 (1980) (stating that the definition of
refugee "eliminates the geographical and ideological restrictions now applicable to condi-
tional entrant refugees"); 126 CONG. REc. 4499 (1980) (remarks of Rep. Holtzman) (defini-
tion of refugee "finally eliminates the geographic and ideological restrictions"); 126 CONG.
REc. 4507 (1980) (statement of Rep. Chisholm) (expressing hope that refugee admissions
would not become tainted "with ideological, geographical or racial or ethnic biases" and
criticizing exclusive admission of persons from communist or Middle Eastern countries).
12 For critical discussions of the political nature of refugee law, see J. Michael Cavosie,
Defending the Golden Door: The Persistence of Ad Hoc and Ideological Decision Making in U.S. Refugee
Law, 67 IND. L.J. 411 (1992); Joan Fitzpatrick & Robert Pauw, Foreign Polity, Asylum and Discre-
tion, 28 WIuAME-rE L. REy. 751 (1992); Kevin R. Johnson, A "Hard Look" at the Executive
Branch's Asylum Decisions, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 279 (1991); and Note, Prisoners of Foreign Policy:
An Argument For Ideological Neutrality in Asylum, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1878 (1991).
13 842 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Va. 1994).
14 Id. at 874. See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text (describing China's popula-
tion control policy).
15 See infra notes 51-74 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 75-92 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 21-92 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 93-205 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 206-53 and accompanying text.
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on the issue of refugee status for Chinese nationals and for its illumina-
tion of the intrusion of politics into the arena of asylum law.20
II. Statement of the Case
Guo Chun Di 2 l was a twenty-eight year old citizen of the PRC. 22
Mr. Guo, along with approximately three hundred other Chinese na-
tionals, fled his homeland aboard the vessel Golden Venture, which ran
aground in New York Harbor on June 6, 1993.23 Mr. Guo was rescued
while attempting to swim ashore and was taken into custody by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).24 He was charged by
INS with attempting to enter the United States without valid docu-
ments. 25 Mr. Guo asserted a claim for political asylum and was trans-
ferred to a state detention center in Winchester, Virginia, pending
exclusion and deportation proceedings.2 6
At a hearing before an immigration judge in Arlington, Virginia,
Mr. Guo testified through an interpreter and explained the circum-
stances that led to his decision to flee the PRC. 27 He testified that after
the birth of his first child, government planning officials ordered Mr.
Guo's wife to report to a local hospital for a sterilization operation. 28
Because of her opposition to involuntary sterilization, Mr. Guo's wife
fled from her home village to a distant city where relatives lived.2 9
Government family planning officials then sent Mr. Guo a similar no-
tice to report to a local hospital for sterilization.30 Also opposed to this
procedure, Mr. Guo fled his village and joined his wife in the city.31
While there, Mr. Guo received word that government officials had vis-
20 See infra notes 254-70 and accompanying text.
21 Guo Chun Di's name is given in the Chinese fashion, that is, surname first.
22 Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 861 (E.D. Va. 1994).
23 Id. The Golden Venture was a cargo freighter piloted during its three month voyage by
a crew of thirteen Indonesian nationals. See Matter of G, Int. Dec. 3215 (BIA 1993) (describ-
ing the Golden Venture incident). The vessel ran aground approximately 100 to 200 yards
offshore of the Fort Tilden military reservation located on the Rockaway Peninsula in the
Gateway National Recreation Area of Queens, New York. Id. According to newspaper ac-
counts of several passengers interviewed, pandemonium erupted on board when the ship
grounded. Id. Passengers spewed out of the cargo bay in which they had been cooped dur-
ing the voyage and into the fifty-three degree waters. Id. Many of the ship's passengers who
attempted to swim ashore suffered from hypothermia and collapsed upon reaching the
beach. Id. At least seven of the passengers of the Golden Venture are reported to have died.
Jane Fritsch, Smuggled To New York: The Immigrants - Seven Die as Crowded Immigrant Ship
Grounds Off Queens, N.Y. TimES, June 7, 1993, at Al. The pilots were later arrested and
charged with smuggling. Id.
24 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 861.
25 Id.
26 Id. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (setting forth exclusion and deporta-
tion procedure).
27 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 861.
28 Id. at 861-62. See infra notes 93-108 and accompanying text (discussing the PRC's
population control policy).





ited his home, confiscated his and his wife's personal property, and
destroyed their home.3 2 Mr. Guo testified that upon receiving this in-
formation he decided to leave the PRC and come to the United
States.33
Mr. Guo testified that in addition to his one child, he wished to
have two more children.34 He feared that family planning officials in
the PRC would not allow this to happen.3 5 Mr. Guo further testified
that he feared that if returned to the PRC he would be imprisoned for
his prior noncompliance and forced to undergo the government-
ordered sterilization. 36
The immigration judge found Mr. Guo to be truthful and ac-
cepted his account of the circumstances that led to his decision to flee
the PRC. 3 7 Nonetheless, the immigration judge ruled that Mr. Guo
was "not a 'refugee' as that term is defined by the law."38 Therefore,
the immigration judge ruled that Mr. Guo was not eligible for asylum
in the United States; rather he was subject to exclusion and
deportation.3 9
The immigration judge relied on Matter of Chang,40 a decision by
the BIA41 holding that a coercive population control policy that in-
cludes sterilization does not constitute "persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion." 42 Mr. Guo appealed the decision of the immigra-





36 Id. An excerpt from Mr. Guo's testimony before the immigration judge follows:
Q: And can you say exactly why you wanted to leave China?
A: Because I feared that China has no freedom. Because I only have one
child, I want to have two more child, but they don't let me have. If... I afraid
that if they find me, they will took me to get sterilize operation.Q: Why did you want to come to the United States instead of some other
country?
A: Because I heard about the U.S. is a freedom country.Q: What do you think will happen to you if you are sent back to China?




38 Id. (quoting the opinion of the immigration judge); see infra notes 109-17 and accom-
panying text (discussing the definition of "refugee" under the law).
39 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 862.
40 Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989).
41 Unless modified by the BIA or the Attorney General of the United States, decisions of
the BIA are binding upon immigration judges. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (1994).
42 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 862 (quoting Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA)).
See also 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1988) (defining "refugee" to mean "any person who is
outside any country of such person's nationality... who is unable or unwilling to avail him-
self or herself of the protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion .... ").
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invalidated by certain federal regulations. 43
The Board of Immigration Appeals rejected Mr. Guo's appeal,
noting that Changwas still valid controlling administrative precedent. 44
The Board ruled that the federal regulations cited by Mr. Guo "were
not codified and [had] no force or effect."45 Mr. Guo then petitioned
the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for a writ 'of
habeas corpus.46
The District Court, with Judge Ellis presiding, granted Mr. Guo's
petition for writ of habeas corpus.47 In so doing, the court held that
none of the several inconsistent administrative pronouncements re-
garding the ability of aliens to seek asylum based on opposition to co-
ercive population control policies were entitled to judicial deference. 8
The court further found that Mr. Guo had met the statutory criteria
for political asylum by proving that he had fled his country to avoid
arrest, imprisonment, and involuntary sterilization because he and his
wife opposed and would not obey their country's policy of coercive
population control. 49 The court found that Mr. Guo had made an
overt manifestation of his opposition to the population control policy
and that he had been persecuted for expressing this opposition.50
The District Court reviewed the "regulatory saga"51 of the execu-
tive branch's position on the refugee status of Chinese nationals flee-
ing the PRC's coercive population 'control measures.5 2 The court
ruled that these pronouncements amounted to "an administrative
43 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 862; see infra notes 118-53 (discussing federal regula-
tions Mr. Guo asserted had invalidated Chang).
44 Guo Chun Di 842 F. Supp. at 862. The BIA has consistently applied Chang in consid-
ering applications for asylum filed by aliens who claim they fear persecution on the basis of
their opposition to the PRC's population control policies. See, e.g., Matter of G, Int. Dec.
3215 (BIA 1993) (reaffirming reliance upon Chang).
45 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 862.
46 Id. "While the Courts of Appeal have 'sole and exclusive' jurisdiction over all final
orders of deportation, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1988), district courts have jurisdiction over
habeas corpus petitions filed by aliens in custody who, after exhausting their administrative
remedies, seek review of an exclusion order." Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 864 n.7 (citing
Castillo-Magallon v. INS, 729 F.2d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 1984)).
The filing of the petition, by itself, did not halt INS deportation and exclusion proceed-
ings against Mr. Guo. Id. at 864. In addition to filing the petition, Mr. Guo filed a request
for immediate and preliminary injunctive relief in the Eastern District Court of Virginia. Id.
at 864-65. Prior to oral argument, the parties stipulated that the execution of the INS order
of exclusion and deportation would be stayed. Id. at 865. The court endorsed the stipulation
and postponed resolution of Mr. Guo's request for injunctive relief. Id. At a later date, the
court, pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a) (2), ordered that the merits of the case should be
accelerated and consolidated with the consideration of the preliminary injunction. Id.
47 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 874.
48 Id. at 867.
49 Id. at 873.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 863.
52 Id. at 862-70.
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cacophony undeserving ofjudicial deference." s3 The court noted that
while the BIA had consistently applied the principle elucidated in Mat-
ter of Chang to all asylum claims based on opposition to a country's
coercive family planning policies, 54 this was "only one of many Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) pronouncements" on the issue. 55 The court
pointed out that the most recent pronouncement was a final rule
signed in the waning days of the Bush Administration by then Attorney
General William Barr (January 1993 Rule), 56 the preamble of which
specifically stated that "one effect of this rule is to supersede the deci-
sion of Matter of Chang ... to the extent that it held that the threat of
forced sterilization pursuant to a government family planning policy
does not give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
political opinion .... ,,57 The court noted that it was "especially signifi-
cant" that this was a pronouncement by the Attorney General who has
the authority to overrule BIA decisions. 58
The court addressed, yet failed to satisfactorily resolve, the ques-
tion of whether the January 1993 Rule, which was withdrawn from the
Federal Register three days prior to its publication, 59 ever became effec-
tive.6 The court considered the factors that govern whether a unpub-
53 Id. at 867 ("To hold otherwise would be judicial abdication, not principled judicial
deference.").
54 Id. at 867 & n.11 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (1993) ("decisions designated by the Board
shall serve as precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues")); Matter of G,
Int. Dec. 3215 (BIA) (applying Chang in denying PRC residents asylum based on opposition
to coercive family planning practices); accord Matter of Tsun, A 71 824 320 (BIA June 17,
1993); Matter of Chu, A 71 824 281 (BIAJune 7, 1993).
55 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 867; see infra part III.B. (discussing regulatory history of
refugee status of Chinese nationals fleeing that country's population control measures).
56 See infra notes 146-51 and accompaning text.
57 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 867 (alteration in original).
58 Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(g) (1993) (stating that decisions of the Board shall be bind-
ing in the administration of the Act "[e]xcept as they may be modified or overruled by...
the Attorney General")); see also Matter ofAnselmo, Int. Dec. 3105 (BIA 1989) ("[T]he Board
and immigration judges . . .only have such authority as is created and delegated by the
Attorney General").
59 See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
60 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 867-68. Both Mr. Guo and INS classified the January
1993 Rule as a substantive, as opposed to interpretive, rule. Id. But see id. at 868 n.12 (noting
that the rule "could arguably be classified as an interpretive rule setting forth a general state-
ment of policy").
"Federal Register publication is required for substantive rules of general applicability, as
well as for statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated
and adopted by an agency." Id. at 868 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1) (D) (1988) (Supp. 1992)
and Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Hous. Ctr., 815 F.2d 1343, 1351 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting
that the APA requires publication of rules and public statements if such rules or public state-
ments constitute change from existing law, policy or practice)). However, the court noted
that "failure to publish a rule is not necessarily fatal." Id. (citing Caribbean Produce Exch. v.
Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 893 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1989); and Welch v. United
States, 750 F.2d 1101, 1111 (1st Cir. 1985) ("[F]ailure to publish in the Federal Register does
not automatically invalidate an administrative regulation or guideline.")). But cf Jerri's Ce-
ramic Arts v. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n., 874 F.2d 205, 208 (4th Cir. 1989) (indicating
that a substantive rule not published, as required under the Federal Hazardous Substances
Act, must be set aside).
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lished agency interpretation should nonetheless be given effect 6' and
concluded that under these factors "the unpublished [January] 1993
Rule is arguably entitled to legal effect."62
Regardless, the court pointed out that "there [was] no doubt" that
an interim rule issued in 1990 (January 1990 Interim Rule), 63 which
also contradicted Chang, was validly published and in effect from Janu-
ary through June 1990.64 The court recognized that "this validly pub-
lished and promulgated rule reflect[ed] the considered opinion of the
Attorney General to construe Section 1101 (a) (42) (A) to permit grant-
ing asylum" in cases of applicants fleeing persecution under the coer-
cive population control measures of the PRC.65 However, the court
conceded that "there is significant doubt whether the [January] 1990
Interim Rule [was] either binding on BIAjudges or affected the legal
force of Chang."66
The court also characterized an Executive Order issued by Presi-
dent Bush in 1990 (1990 Executive Order) 67 as having "underscor[ed]
the correctness of the Attorney General's construction of the Act" by
directing the Attorney General and Secretary of State to give "en-
61 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 868. The court cites Nguyen v. United States, 824 F.2d
697 (9th Cir. 1987) for the proposition that
courts should consider a variety of factors in determining whether a non-pub-
lished agency interpretation should nonetheless be given legal effect, including
(i) whether the unpublished interpretation affects individuals' substantive
rights, (ii) whether the interpretation deviates from the plain meaning of the
statute or regulation at issue, and (iii) whether the interpretation limits admin-
istrative discretion.
Guo Chun D 842 F. Supp. at 868 (citing Nguyen, 824 F.2d at 701).
62 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 868. The court pointed out that the January 1993 Rule:
(i) impacts Mr. Guo's substantive rights, id. at 868 n.15 (citing Nguyen, 824 F.2d at 701 (stat-
ing that an unpublished rule affects substantive rights when it changes existing rules, policy,
or practice)); (ii) deviates from other agency interpretations of 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A),
id.; and (iii) restricts the discretion of immigration officers in classifying an individual as a
refugee, id. (citing Nguyen, 824 F.2d at 701).
On the other hand, the court conceded that "the status and legal effect of the Uanuary]
1993 Rule remain unclear." See id. at 868 & n.16. The court determined that it need not
resolve this issue in order to reach a decision in the case at bar. Id. at 868 n.16. Cf Xin-
Chang v. Slattery, 859 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the unpublished January
1993 Rule had binding legal effect upon the BIA).
63 See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
64 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 869. See 55 Fed. Reg. 2803 (1990). See also infra notes
13742 and accompanying text.
65 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 869.
66 The court acknowledged that "[t]hough it contradicted Chang, the January 1990 In-
terim Rule likely did not erase or overrule Chang, for it was apparently an interpretive rule of
limited legal force." Id. See 55 Fed. Reg. 2803, 2804 (1990) ("These amendments are inter-
pretive rules and general statements of policy for establishing statutory eligibility for asylum
.... "1).
To have the force of law, a regulation "must be a substantive or legislative-type rule...
which has been issued by the agency pursuant to statutory authority and promulgated in
accordance with the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act." Morton
v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974). See also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301 (1979);
Jerri's Ceramic Arts v. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n., 874 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1989).
67 See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
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hanced consideration" to asylum claims related to an applicant's oppo-
sition to the PRC's policy of forced abortion or coercive sterilization. 68
Finally, the court stated that "it is worth noting that four Attorneys
General in three administrations have made pronouncements" regard-
ing the refugee status of immigrants fleeing the PRC population con-
trol policy.69
The court in Guo Chun Di v. Carroll recognized the "well estab-
lished principle" dictated by the Supreme Court in Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council70 that an agency's interpretation of its statute
or regulation is entitled to considerable judicial deference. 71 None-
theless, the court held that judicial deference was not warranted for
the agency construction of Section 1101 (a) (42) (A) expressed in Matter
of Chang.72 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon a line of
decisions limiting the appropriateness of judicial deference to those
instances in which an agency's interpretation of its own statutes and
regulations has been consistent.73 The court concluded that on the
question of statutory interpretation of Section 1101 (a) (42) (A), "there
[was] a cacophony of administrative voices, each singing a different
tune in a different key" and that therefore "[d] eference to one voice or
one tune in these circumstances [was] unwarranted." 74
The court then considered, independently of past administrative
interpretations of Section 1101(a) (42) (A), whether Mr. Guo met the
definition of "refugee" so as to qualify for asylum under the Act. 75 The
68 Gut Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 869. But see Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d
1498, 1510-11, (1 1th Cir.) (holding that an Executive Order that set forth procedures for the
interdiction of Haitian migrants on the high seas did not give rise to a private cause of ac-
tion), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
69 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 870. Attorney General Edwin Meese in August 1988
"promulgated a series of policy guidelines classifying opposition to coercive population con-
trol measures as 'political opinion' sufficient" for refugee status. Id.; see infra note 119 and
accompanying text. Attorney General Richard Thornburgh then issued the January 1990
Interim Rule "which implicitly overruled Chang." Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 870; see infra
note 137 and accompanying text. Attorney General William Barr signed the January 1993
Rule "that was explicitly intended to overrule Chang.! Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 870; see
infra note 147 and accompanying text. Finally, in December 1993 current Attorney General
Janet Reno declined an opportunity to resolve the conflict between Chang and the other
conflicting DOJ interpretations of Section 1101(a) (42) (A). Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 870;
see infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
70 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
71 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 865-66.
72 Id. at 870.
73 Id. at 866 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987); General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105
(1971); Wilcox v. Ives, 864 F.2d 915, 924-25 (1st Cir. 1988); United Transp. Union v. Dole,
797 F.2d 823, 829 (10th Cir. 1986); and Allen v. Bergland, 661 F.2d 1001, 1004 (4th Cir.
1981)).
74 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 870. The Court also noted that, "in any event, 'the
agency's preferred interpretation is only one input in the interpretational equation.' " Id. at
870 n.25 (citing United Transp. Union v. Dole, 797 F.2d 823, 829 (10th Cir. 1986) and Zuber
v. Allen 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969)).
75 Id. at 870-71.
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court separated its inquiry into two stages: (1) "whether [Mr. Guo's]
opposition to coercive population control practices in the PRC con-
stitut[ed] a 'political opinion' within the meaning of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a) (43) (A);" and (2) "whether [Mr. Guo had] a particularized,
well-founded fear of persecution based on this purported political
opinion."76
The court concluded that "there can be little doubt that the
phrase 'political opinion' encompasses an individual's view regarding
procreation." 77 The court began by noting that the term "political" is
commonly understood to mean "of or pertaining to the exercise of
rights or privileges .... -78 The court cited the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Skinner v. Oklahoma79 for the proposition that "the right to bear
children is 'one of the basic civil rights of man.' "so Particularly, the
court emphasized that Skinner viewed involuntary sterilization as an
egregious infringement of this fundamental right:81
The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and
devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands, it can cause races or types
which are inimical to the dominant group to whither and disappear.
There is no redemption for the individual whom the law touches. Any
experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is
forever deprived of a basic liberty.
8 2
The court analogized the right to procreate, which is protected
under the Bill of Rights,83 to other fundamental rights that are well
recognized as legitimate grounds for asylum.8 4 In addition, the court
ruled that "it [was] beyond dispute that the expression of one's views
regarding issues related to the right to procreate is 'political'." 85
76 Id. at 871-72.
77 Id. at 872.
78 I. (quoting BLACK'S LAw DIcr1oNARv 1158 (6th ed. 1991)).
79 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating state statute allowing for involuntary sterilization of
habitual offenders).
80 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 872 (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541); accord Carey v.
Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-56 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965). "While the right to procreate is not
absolute, intrusions upon this fundamental right are looked upon with disfavor." Guo Chun
Di, 842 F.Supp. at 872 (citing Carey, 431 U.S. at 687 ("[T]he teaching of Griswold is that the
Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intru-
sion by the State.")).
81 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 872 (citing Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541).
82 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
83 See Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-85 ("The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is
at the very heart of [a] cluster of constitutionally protected choices."); Griswold, 381 U.S. at
484-86.
84 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 872 (discussing asylum based upon freedom of religion
and freedom of speech).
85 Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2815
(1992) (expressing hesitation to overrule Roe v. Wade: "[W]hatever the premises of opposi-
tion may be, only the most convincing justification under accepted standards of precedent
could suffice to demonstrate that a later decision overruling the first was anything but a
surrender to political pressure .... ). "In addition, opposition to certain aspects of procrea-
tive rights and privileges may involve the exercise of protected political rights and privileges."
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The court held that the right to procreate and the expression of
that right are analogous to other fundamental rights that may support
an asylum claim based upon "persecution on the basis of political opin-
ion."86 Therefore, Mr. Guo's opposition to the PRC's family planning
policies constituted a "political opinion" within the meaning of Section
1101 (a) (42) (A).87
Finally, the court in Guo Chun Di considered whether Mr. Guo had
a "well-founded fear of persecution" because of his "overt manifesta-
tion of a political opinion."88 The court found that "[t]here can be no
question that [Mr. Guo] made an 'overt manifestation' of his opposi-
tion to the PRC's 'one couple one child' policy, and that [he] has been
persecuted for expressing this opposition."89 Thus, the court ruled
that Mr. Guo had established prima facie eligibility for asylum. 90 The
court therefore stated that Mr. Guo was, in essence, "one of the 'hud-
dled masses . . . yearning to be free' who [had] established statutory
eligibility for asylum,"91 and that it was now within the discretion of the
Attorney General to grant or deny his asylum request.92
III. Background Law
A. China's Population Control Policy
For Communist China, population has always played an important
role in the Communist Party's ideology. In the 1950s Communist Party
Chairman Mao Zedong officially encouraged people to have children
as part of their civic duty because, as one analyst wrote, Mao "regarded
each newborn Chinese as a set of productive hands waiting to work
.... Under this policy, the population growth rate in the PRC in-
creased from 1.6 percent in 1949 to 2.8 percent in 1965.9 4 In 1979
Id. (citing Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (discussing bal-
ancing of rights of abortion protesters and women seeking abortions)).
86 Id. at 873.
87 Id,
88 Id. (citing De Valle v. INS, 901 F.2d 787, 797 (9th Cir. 1990) and Bolanos-Hernadez v.
INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1287 (9th Cir. 1984)).
89 Id. The court found that Mr. Guo and his wife's opposition to the PRC's family plan-
ning policies had been openly expressed by their refusal to comply with sterilization orders
and by fleeing their village in response to those orders. Id The government's response to
these actions was to confiscate the couple's personal property and to destroy their home. Id
The court held that "it simply defies logic to contend that these governmental actions do not
amount to persecution." Id.
90 Id. at 874.
91 Id, (citing E. LAZARUS, NEW COLOSSUS (alteration in original)).
92 Id, (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988) and MA. v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 307 (4th Cir.
1990) (en banc)); see infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text (discussing the discretionary
aspect of a grant of asylum).
93 Steven Mufson, Population Curbs Slip in China, 1.2 Billion Reached Five Years Early,
WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1995, at A17. Chairman Mao was the leader of the Communist Party of
China in 1949 when the post-revolution People's Republic of China was founded. See P.R.C.
CONST. pmbl.
94 Mufson, supra note 93, at A17.
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Mao revised his strategy and launched the PRC's "one couple, one
child" policy as the centerpiece of an ambitious plan to contain
China's population at 1.2 billion by the year 2000.9 5
Population control is considered one of the most important objec-
tives on China's Communist Party agenda. Article Twenty-Five of the
Constitution of the PRC, which was adopted on December 4, 1982,
provides: "The state promotes family planning so that population
growth may fit the plans for economic and social development." 96 Chi-
nese leaders consider their policy of "one couple, one child" a fight for
national, as well as party, survival. The PRC's Minister of Family Plan-
ning explained:
The size of a family is too important to be left to the personal decision
of a couple. Births are a matter of state planning, just like other eco-
nomic and social activities, because they are a matter of strategic con-
cern. A couple cannot have a baby just because it wants to. That
cannot be allowed if China is to stabilize its population and keep it
from doubling and redoubling as it might.97
As one observer noted:
Faced with strong popular resistance, Peking resorts to even stronger
measures. To this struggle, it brings the full powers of a totalitarian
state, operating without fear of political opposition. There is no check
on official abuse, no outlet for human rights complaints and no forum
for public debate of this policy.
What emerges from more than 200 interviews spaced over three
years with officials, doctors, peasants and workers in almost two-thirds
of China's 29 main subdivisions is the Story of an all-out government
siege against ancient family traditions and the reproductive habits of a
billion people.98
China's family planning policy is backed by the full organizational
might of the Communist Party.99 In the PRC, every citizen belongs to
95 ld. The population control program in China is guided by a joint directive of the
Chinese Communist Party and the State entitled "On the Further Implementation of Family
Planning Work" issued in 1982. Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989) (citing Letter
from Library of Congress to Immigration and Naturalization Service (Nov. 23, 1987) [herein-
after Library of Congress Letter]). The policy provides that citizens are allowed only one
child per couple, with limited exceptions when permission is obtained. Id. For a compre-
hensive history of the establishment and implementation of the "one couple, one child" pol-
icy, see JUDITH BANISTER, CHINA'S CHANGING POPULATION 185-226 (1987).
The technical policy of birth control is formulated by the State Family Planning
Commission with the approval of the leadership of the Party Central. Its
prinicipal content is: "Those women who have already given birth to one child
must be fitted with IUD's, and couples who already have two children must
undergo sterilization by either the husband or the wife. Women with unplan-
ned pregnancies must adopt remedial measures as soon as possible."
Id. at 212. "Remedial measures" is a euphemism used by the Chinese government officials
for abortion. Id. at 208. China's population reached 1.2 billion in 1995, five years ahead of
the government's goal. Mufson, supra note 93, at Al7.
96 P.R.C. CONST. art. XXV.
97 Michael Weisskopf, One Couple, One Child: Abortion Policy Tears at China's Society,
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a unit, which is a workplace or rural governing body.100 Every unit has
a birth control committee headed by Party officials. 1° 1 These officials
control citizens' salaries; their eligibility to occupy housing space and
to grow crops; their educational opportunities; as well as their ability to
marry and have children.' 02 Peking, in order to insure compliance
with the policy, distributes cash bonuses to local officials only if their
units observe birth control limits. 1 .03
Opposition to the "one couple, one child" policy is considered
political dissent in the PRC and is dealt with severely. 10 4 This reality is
evident in a series of letters by the Population Control Office of a bear-
ing factory in Dalian, China. The letters were sent to a Chinese woman
studying in the United States who had learned she was pregnant with
her second child:
Birth control is one of our nation's basic policies.
Second children are absolutely banned. If a woman insists on having a
second child, all the staff and line workers of her factory will be pun-
ished. No salary increases will be allowed, and the factory will be dis-
qualified from production contests. She herself will be placed on
probation, and receive only minimum living expenses. You absolutely
cannot afford these political and financial losses .... Do not lose
anymore time. Fix this problem as soon as possible.
If you come back at the end of this year pregnant, even if you are eight
or nine months along, you will absolutely not be allowed to have
100 I.
101 Id.
102 Id.; 1985 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACrIcES, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 740
(1986) [hereinafter 1985 COUNTRY REPORTS]
Extensive regulation of individual and family life is one of the distinctive fea-
tures of the Chinese sociopolitical system. For most Chinese (particularly ur-
ban residents), life revolves around the work unit, which provides not only
employment, but housing, ration coupons, permission to marry and have a
child, and other aspects of ordinary life ....
Id.
103 Weisskopf, supra note 97, at Al; Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989) (citing
Library of Congress Letter, supra note 95) ("Economic sanctions, peer pressure and propo-
ganda are used to insure compliance.").
When the local cadres report failure, they are publicly criticized and admon-
ished to stop waivering in their determination to succeed. Always speaking in
euphenisms, the media urge the local cadres to achieve the ends no matter
what the means required. Indeed, when it comes to family planning program
abuses ... the roots of coercion originate from the top.
BANISTER, supra note 95, at 205.
104 See BANISTER, supra note 95, at 200.
To refuse to control fertility or to encourage others to refuse is sometimes
treated as a crime against the state.... Most married people of reproductive
age in China must control their fertility to avoid being guilty of an ideological
offense in the eyes of the government. Those who would rather not practice
birth control find that they must do so, or at least pretend to, in order to avoid
political reprisals.
Id. "[Flamily planning must be understood as the implementation of party discipline and
state law." Director of State Family Planning Commission quoted in Jiankang Bao [Health
Gazette, Beijing], Feb. 27, 1983, at 1.
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your baby.
105
The Chinese government has consistently denied supporting the
use of force to obtain compliance with birth quotas.10 6 However, Prov-
inces are allowed to make their own regulations regarding enforce-
ment of the population control laws so long as overall birthrates match
the state imposed goals. 107 Overwhelming evidence indicates that the
"one couple, one child" policy is enforced by local officials through
violent methods that include mandatory sterilization, forced abortions
and infanticide.' 08
B. The Refugee Act of 1980
Congress added the definition of refugee to U.S. law by means of
the Refugee Act of 1980.109 In so doing, Congress intended to con-
form the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 110 to which the United
States acceded in 1968.111
105 Stephen Mosher, The Long Arm of 'One.Child' China, WASH. POST, April 10, 1988, at BI.
Stephen Mosher, the journalist who published this and numerous other articles about the
policy after an extended visit to China in the early 1980s, was branded by Chinese authorities
as an "international spy." See Stephen Mosher, 'One Family, One Child' China's Brutal Birth
Ban; For Chinese Women, It's Abortion or Sterilization, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1987, at D1.
106 Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (citing Library of Congress Letter, supra note 95).
107 ld.
108 "Although coercive family planning is contrary to official Chinese policy, there have
been numerous reports of coercive birth control practices, including forced abortions and
sterilization .... 1985 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 102. See, e.g., STEVEN MOSHER, A
MOTHER'S ORDEAL: ONE WOMAN'S FIGHT AGAINST CHINA'S ONE-CHILD POLICY (1993); JOHN
AIRD, SLAUGHTER OF THE INNOCENTS: COERCIVE BIRTH CONTROL (1990); BANISTER, supra note
95; Nicholas Kristof, China's Crackdown on Births: A Stunning, and Harsh, Success, N.Y. TIMES,
April 25, 1993, at Al; Steven Mosher, 'One Couple, One Child'. China's Brutal Birth Ban; For
Chinese Women, Its Abortion of Sterilization, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1987, at Dl; Weisskopf, supra
note 97; Michael Weisskopf, China Orders Sterilization for Parents, WASH. POST, May 28, 1983, at
Al. These methods are referred to in official jargon as "technical measures." BANISTER, supra
note 95, at 201 ("The phrase 'technical measures' is a euphenism for required sterilization,
abortion and IUD insertion."). Implementation of "technical measures," rather than educa-
tion or voluntary compliance, is the main criterion for judging the achievements of local
family planning officials. Id. at 202.
109 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
110 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 [hereinafter U.N. Protocol]. Article 1.2 of the Protocol defines a
refugee as one who, "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country .... " U.N. Protocol, supro, at art. 1.2.
Article 1.2 of the Protocol largely incorporated the definition of refugee contained in
Article IA(a) of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, to which the United States was not a party.
1I H.R. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 14-15 (1979), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 141,144, 154-55; H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1979); Matter of
Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985).
Because Congress intended for the definition of refugee under the Refugee Act of 1980
to conform to the U.N. Protocol, the BIA has recognized the appropriateness of considering
international interpretations of the agreement when determining the meaning of "refugee"
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A grant of asylum under the Act is a matter of discretion. 112
Aliens seeking asylum are eligible for the favorable exercise of that dis-
cretion only after a determination that they qualify as a "refugee"
under Section 1101(a) (42) (A) of the Act. 113 This section creates four
separate elements that must be satisfied before an alien qualifies as a
refugee: (1) the alien must have a "fear of persecution";' 14 (2) the
fear must be "well-founded";1 15 (3) the persecution must be "on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion";' 16 and (4) the alien must be "unwilling to
return" to his country of nationality because of his well-founded fear of
persecution. 117
C. Regulatory History
The history of the position of the United States government and
its various agencies toward the refugee status of Chinese nationals flee-
ing persecution as a result of that country's coercive population con-
trol measures is a bizarre and convoluted story of bureaucratic
inconsistency.
In August 1988, the DOJ issued policy guidelines to the INS
designed to insure that asylum would be granted to persons showing a
well-founded fear of government persecution stemming from the
PRC's involuntary sterilization and abortion programs.1 18
under the Act. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211. However, the Board held that these interpreta-
tions were not binding upon them, "for the determination of who should be a refugee is
ultimately left by the Protocol to each State in whose territory a refugee finds himself." Id.
(citing Young, Between Sovereigns: A Reexamination of the Refugee's Status, The Transnational
Legal Problems of Refugees, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 339, 344-45 (1982); OFFCE OF
THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEE, THE HANDBOOK ON THE PROCEDURES
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 1, 3-4 (Geneva, 1979) [hereinafter U.N.
HANDBOOK]; and INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 n.22 (1984)).
112 See8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988).
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present
in the United States . . . to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted
asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General deter-
mines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section
1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.
ld.
11 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 427-28
(1987) ("Under [Section 1158(a)], eligibility for asylum depends entirely on the Attorney
General's determination that an alien is a 'refugee,' as that term is defined in [Section
1101(a) (42) (A)] .... "). For the Act's definition of "refugee," see supra note 11. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (1988).




118 Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 862 (E.D. Va. 1994). These guidelines
were described in the Congressional Record as follows:
The Attorney General [Meese] issued guidelines instructing asylum adjudica-
tors to give "careful consideration" to applications from PRC nationals who
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
In May 1989 the BIA issued its decision in Matter of Chang. 19 In
that decision the Board held that the implementation of the "one
couple, one child" policy by the government of the PRC, "in and of
itself, even to the extent that involuntary sterilization may occur,9 is
not persecution, nor does it create "a well-founded fear of persecution
'on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.' "120, The Board expressly stated that
it was not bound by the policy guidelines announced a year earlier by
the DOJ because those guidelines were directed toward the INS and
not toward immigration judges and the Board.12 1
The petitioner in Chang in his application for asylum indicated
that neither he nor his family had been mistreated, and that the family
had not suffered from the government's policy any more than the rest
of the citizens of the PRC.1 22 The petitioner's testimony regarding his
alleged persecution under the "one couple, one child" policy was
found by the Board to be "simply not sufficiently detailed to provide a
plausible and coherent account of the basis of his asylum claim
.... "123 The Board also found the testimony to have been contra-
dicted by other information on the record. 12 4 It was based on this ac-
count that the BIA found that the mere implementation of the PRC's
population control policy was not "on its face persecutive." 125
The Board did not foreclose the possibility that the policy could
be enforced in such a manner so as to be persecution on account of a
ground protected by the Act. 126 However, according to the Board's
seek asylum because they have defied their government's population control
policies.
DOJ guidelines, noting that the PRC government views such defiance
as an act of 'political dissent', state that "a finding of the requisite 'well-founded
fear of persecution' under these circumstances is reasonable." This constitutes
persecution for 'political opinion' under the Immigration Act and would result
in a grant of asylum.
Id. (citing 135 CONG. REc. S8244 (daily ed. July 19, 1989)).
119 Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989).
120 Id.
121 Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 2.1, 3.1, 236.1, 236.3, 242.2(d), 242.8(a) (1988) (delegating
and defining the authority of the INS commissioner, BIA and immigration judges)); see also
United States ex ret Accardi v. Shaughnessey, 347 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1954) ("The Board must
exercise its own judgement when considering appeals ....").
122 Chang. Int. Dec. 3107. In fact, the petitioner in Chang made no reference to the
PRC's population control measures in his asylum application. Id. Instead, he indicated that
he was an anti-communist who fled his homeland "because of Communist domination of
China." Id. It was not until his deportation hearing that the petitioner in Chang testified that
he feared persecution because, among other things, "he and his wife were forced to flee from
their commune because they had two children and did not agree to stop having more chil-
dren; and, that they disagreed with China's family planning policies . Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. "Because the alien in Chang failed to establish the factual predicate of a well-
founded fear of persecution, the holding (in Chang] with respect to involuntary sterilization
is arguably dictum." Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 862 n.2 (E.D. Va. 1994).
126 Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107. According to the Board, an applicant for asylum
[VOL. 20
1995] CHINESE REFUGEE STATUS
holding, "a policy [that is] tied solely to controlling population, rather
than as a guise for acting against people for reasons protected by the
Act," can never be the basis for a well-founded fear of persecution.1 27
The Board addressed the applicant's assertion that the right to
procreate is a fundamental right under the United States Constitution,
and that any country abridging that right must be engaging in persecu-
tion.128 The Board stated that "the fact thata citizen of another coun-
try may not enjoy the same constitutional protections as a citizen of the
United States does not mean that he is therefor persecuted on account
of one of the five grounds enumerated in . .. the Act. '1 29
Shortly after the decision in Chang, efforts were made in Congress
to overturn it. These efforts culminated in the Armstrong-DeConcini
Amendment to the Emergency- Chinese Immigration Relief Act of
1989,130 an amendment offered expressly for that purpose.' 3 ' By
November 1989, the Senate had unanimously passed the Amendment
and the House, by a substantial margin, had voted to concur in the
amendment. 132 President Bush, while voicing approval for the amend-
ment, vetoed the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989
because of concerns about other portions of the bill.133 While the
House of Representatives voted to override the veto, the Senate failed
to do so by a margin of five votes. 134 Several of the Senators who voted
to uphold the veto stated that they did so relying upon assurances
made by the President that administrative action would be taken to
reverse Chang.13 5
would need to provide additional facts proving that the population policy was in fact persecu-
tive or that he had a well-founded fear that it would be persecutive "on account of one of the
five reasons enumerated in section 1101 (a) (42) (A)." Id. Examples the Board gives of how
the population policy could be enforced so as to amount to persecution under the Act in-
clude: selective application against members -of particular religious groups; use to punish
persons for their political opinions; or more severe treatment of those who publicly oppose
the policy. Id.
128 1&l
129 Id. Similarly, the court argued that even if the population control policy of the PRC
were found to be a violation of internationally recognized human rights, "that fact in itself
would not establish that an individual subjected to such [a policy] was a victim of persecution
'on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or polit-
ical opinion.'" Id.
130 H.R. 2712, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)
131 The amendment is reprinted at 135 CONG. Rac. S8244 (daily ed. July 19, 1989):
The Armstrong amendment would by statute apply the DOJ policy to all rele-
vant agencies, including the INS and the Board of Immigration Appeals. It
would thereby assure that applications for asylum by Chinese nationals who
fear persecution because they have defied the party's population control poli-
cies would be given the fullest possible consideration.
Id.
132 Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 863 (E.D. Va. 1994).
133 See Memorandum of Disapproval for the Emergency Chinese Relief Act of 1989, re-
printed in 25 WEEKLY COMp. PREs. Doc. 1853-54 (Nov. 30, 1989) [hereinafter Memorandum of
Disar, roval ] . •
Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 863.
135 Id. (citing 135 CONG. REc. S376 (daily ed.Jan 25, 1990)).
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Faithful to his assurances, President Bush issued instructions to
then Attorney General Thornburgh to take appropriate steps to over-
turn Chang.136 InJanuary 1990, the Attorney General issued theJanu-
ary 1990 Interim Rule amending the regulations governing asylum and
withholding of deportation to allow asylum for those applicants show-
ing a well-founded fear of sterilization or persecution as a result of the
PRC's coercive population control measures. 137 Three months later,
the 1990 Executive Order was issued underscoring the substance of the
January 1990 Interim Rule.138
In July 1990, Attorney General Thornburgh published a final rule
which implemented extensive changes in the regulations pertaining to
asylum and withhiolding of deportation (July 1990 Rule). 139 Inexplica-
bly, the July 1990 Rule made no mention of the January 1990 Interim
Rule and did not refer to the issue of asylum for persecution resulting
from coercive family planning practices in the PRC. 140 Nonetheless,
the July 1990 Rule rewrote the sections of the Code of Federal Regulations
that ostensibly had been amended by the January 1990 Interim
Rule.141 Consequently, when the Code of Federal Regulations was pub-
lished in January 1991, the January 1990 Interim Rule, quite simply,
vanished.
This regulatory hocus-pocus caused understandable confusion
among immigration administrators. In April 1991 the Chief Attorney
Examiner of the BIA made a written inquiry to the Appellate Counsel
of the INS requesting the position of the INS on the status of the Janu-
ary 1990 Interim Rule in light of the July 1990 Rule.' 42 The Appellate
136 Id. See also Memorandum of Disapproval, supra note 133, at 1853-54 ("I [, President
Bush,] have directed that enhanced consideration be provided under the immigration laws
for individuals from any country who express a fear of persecution upon return to their
country related to that country's policy of forced abortion or coerced sterilization.").
137 Specifically, the January 1990 Interim Rule amended then existing 8 C.F.RI § 208.5 to
provide:
(1) Aliens who have a well-founded fear that they will be required ... to be
sterilized because of their country's family planning policies may be granted
asylum on the ground of persecution on account of political opinion.
(2) An applicant who establishes that the applicant (or the applicant's spouse)
has refused ... to be sterilized in violation of a country's family planning pol-
icy, and who has a well-founded fear that he or she will be required.., to be
sterilized or otherwise persecuted if the applicant were returned to such coun-
try may be granted asylum.
55 Fed. Reg. 2803-05 (1990).
138 The executive order stated:
The Secretary of State and the Attorney General are directed to provide for
enhanced consideration under the immigration laws for individuals from any
country who express a fear of persecution upon return to their country related
to that country's policy of forced abortion or coerced sterilization, as imple-
mented by the Attorney General's regulation effective January 29, 1990.
Exec. Order No. 12,711, 55 Fed. Reg. 13,897 (1990).
139 See 55 Fed. Reg. 30,674 (1990).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See Wang v. Reno, 862 F. Supp. 801, 805 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
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Counsel responded that the January 1990 Interim Rule had not been
amended or repealed and that the Interim regulation remained the
policy of the INS.143 In a memorandum to Regional Counsel and Dis-
trict Counsel dated November 1991, the Office of the General Counsel
of the INS stated that the DOJ and INS's "policy with respect to aliens
claiming asylum or withholding for deportation based upon coercive
family planning policies is that the application of such coercive policies
does constitute persecution on account of political opinion" and di-
rected that INS trial attorneys act accordingly.144 According to this
view, an applicant whose claim was based on family planning measures
involving forced abortions or sterilization was not required to demon-
strate that the coercive measures were tied to a governmental purpose
other than to control the population.' 45
There is some indication that the failure of the July 1990 Rule to
include the January 1990 Interim Rule was mere inadvertence. 146 Re-
gardless, in the waning days of the Bush administration, then Attorney
General William Barr signed the January 1993 Rule, a final rule that
essentially reiterated the January 1990 Interim Rule. 147 The January
1993 Rule was sent to the Federal Register where it was made available for
public inspection and scheduled for publication on January 25,
1993.148 Immediately after President Clinton was inaugurated on Jan-
uary 22, 1993, the proposed Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, Leon Panetta, issued a directive prohibiting the publication of
any new regulations not approved by a new agency head appointed by
President Clinton.1 49 Acting on this directive, the Acting Assistant
Attorney General sent a memorandum to the Office of the Federal
Register requesting the return of, among other things, the January
1993 Rule.150 The January 1993 Rule has not been resubmitted
or published.1 5 1
InJune 1993, Attorney General Reno granted a request by the BIA
143 Id.
144 Id.; Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 866-67 (E.D. Va. 1994); Matter of G,
Int. Dec. 3215 (BIA 1993).
145 Matter of G, Int. Dec. 3215; cf. Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989) (holding
that in order to make a showing of persecution, the applicant must present evidence that
"the governmental action [arises] for a reason other than general population control ....").
146 An October 1990 article entitled "INS Asylum Regulations Mistakenly Supersede Reg-
ulations on PRC 'One Couple, One Child Policy'" characterizes the July 1990 rule as "an
example of the bureaucratic left hand not noticing what the bureaucratic right hand is do-
ing." 67 Interpreter Releases 1222 (Oct. 29, 1990). The article further quotes an INS spokes-
person as indicating that new regulations would be issued to correct the oversight. Id.
However, at least one court has pointed out that "the fact that the omission was not
subsequently reversed suggests that it was not inadvertent." Si v. Slattery, 864 F. Supp. 397,
401 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
147 Guo Chun Di 842 F. Supp. at 864.
148 Id.
149 58 Fed. Reg. 6074 (1993).
150 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 864.
151 Id.
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to review two cases of individuals seeking asylum based on the PRC's
population control measures in order to resolve the conflict between
the 1990 Executive Order and Chang.152 After several months, the At-
torney General concluded, without explanation, that no determination
was required concerning the conflict between the 1990 Executive Or-
der and Matter of Chang and rescinded her grant of review. 153
D. Judicial Deference
In an appeal from a decision of the BIA, the Board's conclusions
of law are reviewable de novo.154 The Board's factual findings, however,
are given considerable deference.1 55 A finding of fact will not be dis-
turbed simply because the reviewing court differs with the Board's eval-
uation of the facts; the court will uphold the Attorney General's
determination whether to grant asylum unless the petitioner shows
that the action was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.1 5 6
Additionally, in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,157
the Supreme Court held that an agency's interpretation of its statute
152 See Att'y Gen. Order No. 1756-93 (June 29, 1993). The Attorney General has the
authority to perform such a review pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h)(1)(ii) (1993).
153 The Attorney General's statement follows:
IN EXCLUSION PROCEEDINGS Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1 (h) (1) (ii), the
Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") referred, for my review, its decisions in
these two cases in which nationals of the People's Republic of China claimed
eligibility for asylum and withholding of deportation under the Immigration
and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1253(h). In both
cases, the BIA found that the applicant's evidence was not credible, and that
the applicants' accounts, if true, were inadequate to establish eligibility for asy-
lum and withholding of deportation under the interpretation of the INA that
the BIA adopted in Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107, 1989 WL 247513 (B.IA.
May 12, 1989). The BIA also noted that Executive Order No. 12,711, 55 Fed.
Reg. 13,897 (1990), which sets forth standards for eligibility for asylum and
withholding of deportation of aliens fleeing coercive abortion and sterilization
policies, is in conflict with Chang. Matter of Chu, A 71 824 281 (B.IA June 7,
1993) at 6-14; Matter of Tsun, A 71 824 320 (B.I.A. June 7,1993) at 7-11. In
referring these cases for my review, the BIA requested that I resolve the con-
flict. I granted the BIA's request for review. Attorney General Order No. 1756-
93 (June 29, 1993). After review, it is apparent that the BIA's determination in
these cases do [sic] not require a determination that one or the other of these
standards is lawful and binding. Because such a determination is not required,
the Order granting review is rescinded.
Att'y Gen. Order No. 1756-93 (June 29, 1993).
154 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts reviewing agency decisions must
consider questions of law de novo. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). See also Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, 17
F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1994); Abdenini v. INS, 971 F.2d 188, 190-91 (9th Cir. 1992);'Si v. Slat-
tery, 864 F. Supp. 397, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Doherty v. Thornburgh, 750 F. Supp. 131, 135
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd 943 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. dismissed 1123 S. Ct. 1254 (1992).
155 See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (4) (1988) (stating that findings of fact are conclusive "if sup-
ported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a
whole"). The Supreme Court, in INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992), stated that a
petitioner seeking reversal of a BIA factual determination must show "that the evidence he
presented was so compelling that no reasonable fact finder could fail to find the requisite
fear of persecution." Id. at 815.
156 Castillo-Rodriguez v. INS, 992 F.2d 181, 184 (5th Cir. 1991).
157 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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or regulation is entitled to considerable judicial deference. 158  The
Court established a two-part analysis for reviewing an agency's con-
struction of the statute it administers:
First... is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the
court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construc-
tion on the statute .... Rather .... the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute. 159
The Court explained that "[t]he power of an administrative
agency to administer a congressionally created.., program necessarily
requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any
gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." 160 Thus the Court held
that an agency's construction is to be given controlling weight if it is
reasonable and not "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute."
16 1
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron, courts have recog-
nized certain limits to the notion of judicial deference to agency inter-
pretations. 162 One such exception states that deference is less
appropriate where an agency's interpretation of its own statutes and
regulations has been inconsistent.1 63 In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,16 4 the
158 Id. at 842-43.
159 Id. (emphasis added). "The court need not conclude that the agency construction
was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the
reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial pro-
ceeding." Id. at 843 n.11.
160 Id. at 843 (alteration in original) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
161 Id. at 844 ("A court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.").
162 A comprehensive review of the treatment that the Chevron principle has received by
subsequent courts is beyond the scope of this note. For such analysis see Peter Schuck & E.
Donald Elliot, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990
DuKE L. J. 984 (1990); Thomas Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE LJ.
969 (1992); Cass Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. Rv. 2071
(1990).
The court in Chevron explicitly noted two situations in which judicial deference to an
agency's construction would be inappropriate. First, deference is not required in the ab-
sence of administrative interpretation. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 & n.9; see Guo Chun Di, 842 F.
Supp. at 866 (Only when an agency has endeavored to interpret its rules or regulations "is
there any validity to the assumption that underlies judicial deference, namely a congressional
intent to delegate certain policy choices to expert independent agencies or to the Executive
Branch." (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844)). The second instance in which Chevron indicated
deference was inappropriate is where an administrative construction is contrary to clear con-
gressional intent. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 & n.9; accord Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 464 U.S. 89, 98 n.8 (1983); International Bd. of
Teamsters v. Daniels, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.29 (1979) ("Deference is constrained by our obliga-
tion to honor the clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its language, purpose and his-
tory."). The Court in Chevron did not indicate that these were the only situations in which
deference was not warranted.
163 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 866 (citing Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105
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Supreme Court overruled the BIA's interpretation of the burden of
proof required by the Refugee Act of 1980 in order for aliens seeking
asylum to show that they have a "well-founded fear of persecution."1 65
Although the holding in Cardoza-Fonseca was based on the, Court's de-
termination that the agency's interpretation conflicted with the plain
language in the statute,1 66 the decision also contained dicta regarding
the application of judicial deference in light of inconsistent agency in-
terpretation. 167 The Court stated that "[a]n additional reason for re-
jecting INS's request for heightened deference" to the agency's
interpretation of the statute was the "inconsistency of the positions the
BIA has taken through the years." 168 The Court noted that "[a]n
agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the
agency's earlier interpretation is 'entitled to considerably less defer-
ence' than a consistently held agency view."1 69
(1971) (stating that courts are obligated to regard as controlling a reasonable, consistently
applied agency interpretation of its own regulations), and Allen v. Bergland, 661 F.2d 1001,
1004 (4th Cir. 1981)); see also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976) ("[W]e
have declined to follow administrative guidelines in the past where they conflicted with ear-
lier pronouncements of the agency."); United Transp. Union v. Dole, 797 F.2d 823, 829
(10th Cir. 1986) (stating that when faced with conflicting agency constructions, courts will
not engage in "blind adherence" to agency position.)
164 480 U.S. 421 (1987). The issue presented in Cardoza-Fonseca was whether the "well-
founded fear of persecution" standard that must be met by an alien seeking asylum, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a) (42) (A) (1988), and the "clear probability of persecution" standard required to be
met by an applicant for withholding of deportation, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988) (standard of
eligibility for withholding of deportation), were functional equivalents. Cardoza-Fonseca 480
U.S. at 430.
Asylum and withholding of deportation are two distinct remedies under the INA. See
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 429 n.6. (describing the differences between asylum and with-
holding of deportation).
165 Id. at 448-49 (holding that the Immigration Judge and the BIA were incorrect in
holding that the two standards - "well-founded fear" and "clear probability" - are identi-
cal). Id at 448.
166 Id. at 449 ("Our analysis of the plain language of the Act... lead[s] to the inexorable
conclusion that to show a 'well-founded fear of persecution,' an alien need not prove that it
is more likely than not that he or she will be persecuted in his or her home country.").
167 Id at 446 n.30.
168 Id. at 447 n.30 (noting that the BIA and the INS had answered the question as to the
relationship between the two standards in at least three different ways between 1965 and
1985).
169 Id. at 446 n.30 (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981); and citing General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976) ("We have declined to follow administrative
guidelines in the past where they conflicted with earlier pronouncements of the agency."));
accord NLRB v. United Food and Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 124 n.20 (1987) ("We
consider the consistency with which an agency interpretation has been applied... ."); South-
eastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411-12 n.11 (1979) ("[T]he assertion by
HEW of the authority to promulgate any regulations ... has been neither consistent nor
longstanding .... [T]his fact substantially diminishes the deference to be given to HEW's
present interpretation of the statute."); Skidmore v. Swift and Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)
("The weight of such [an administrative] judgement in a particular case will depend upon
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade,
if lacking power to control."); Wilcox v. Ives 864 F.2d 915, 924-25 (1st Cir. 1988); United
Transp. Union v. Dole, 797 F.2d 823, 829 (10th Cir. 1986).
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In Wilcox v. Ives170 the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(HHS) published an initial regulation regarding monthly child sup-
port payments to AFDC families.171 Nine days later the Secretary pro-
posed a second, incongruous version of the same rule. 172 In a Federal
Register statement a year later, the Secretary reiterated the position out-
lined in the second rule but ultimately withdrew the proposed amend-
ment in response to perceived difficulties .that would result from
implementation. 173 The Secretary then "flip flop[ped]" and revised
the rule two more times. 174 The First Circuit observed that "[w]hat is
revealed by the history of the Secretary's regulations .. .since the
amended statute was passed in 1984 is a series of self-contradictory
rules."' 75 The court then held that deference was not appropriate
when the agency's interpretation had "radically and repeatedly alter-
nated between polar extremes ... .176
However, the inconsistency exception to judicial deference has
not been universally applied. The district court in Chen v. Slattery
177
held that "an inconsistency of policy is not, by itself, sufficient to re-
quire less deference to an agency's determination."1 78 Rather, accord-
ing to the court, "[a]n interpretation will be rejected only where it is
unreasonable and at odds with the plain meaning of the statute."'
79
The court relied upon the Second Circuit's decision in Himes v.
Shalala,180 which in turn relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Rust v. Sullivan,181 for the proposition that an agency's interpretation
is entided to deference despite representing "a sharp break with prior
170 864 F.2d 915 (lst Cir. 1988). The issue addressed by the court in Wilcox was whether
to defer to the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) interpretation of 42
U.S.C. § 657(b) (1), the federal statute regarding the distribution of "pass-throughs" of por-
tions of child support payments received by a state to families receiving Aid To Families With
Dependent Children (AFDC). Id. at 916. The dispute between the AFDC recipients and
HHS arose from situations in which no child support payments were received one month and
a multiple payment was received in another month. Id. The Secretary of HHS had promul-
gated a regulation that provided that the AFDC family should receive only a single pass-
through in such situations. 45 C.F.R. § 302.51 (1988).
171 Wilcox, 864 F.2d at 922 (citing 45 C.F.R § 302.51 (1984)).
172 Id (citing 49 Fed. Reg. 36,797 (1984)).
173 Id. (citing 50 Fed. Reg. 19,634 (1985)).
174 Id. at 922-23 (citing 50 Fed. Reg. 19,648 (1985) and 53 Fed. Reg. 21,642 (1988)).
175 Id.
176 Id. at 925.
177 862 F. Supp. 814 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
178 Id. at 821 (citing Himes v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 684, 690 (2d Cir. 1993)); accord Si v.
Slattery, 864 F. Supp. 397, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
'79 Chen, 862 F. Supp. 814.; accord S4 864 F. Supp. at 405.
180 999 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1993). The issue presented in Himes was whether an interpreta-
tion by the Secretary of HHS setting eligibility standards for Medicaid recipients deserved less
deference because it represented a shift in position. Id. at 690. The circuit court held that
the Secretary's shift of position in that case was "not enough to cause this court to ignore the
deference normally due the Secretary. . . because it [was] a reasonable attempt to interpret
and apply all sections of the statute, including [a section] added in 1988 .... Id.
181 500 U.S. 173 (1991)
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interpretations." 182
Rust v. Sullivan concerned a facial challenge to HHS regulations
that limited the ability of Title X fund recipients to engage in abortion
related activities. 183 The petitioners in Rust argued, inter alia, that the
regulations were entitled to little or no deference because they "re-
verse[d] a longstanding agency policy that permitted nondirective
counseling and referral for abortion,"18 4 and thus represented a
"sharp break" from the Secretary's prior construction of the statute.185
The Court stated that it had previously rejected the argument that
"an agency's interpretation 'is not entitled to deference because it rep-
resents a sharp break with prior interpretations' of the statute in ques-
tion."1 86 The Court found that "the Secretary amply justified his
change of interpretation with a 'reasoned analysis.' "187 The Court
found that the Secretary had explained that the regulations were in
response to reports that the prior policy had failed to properly imple-
ment the statute and that it was necessary to provide " 'clear and opera-
tional guidance to grantees about how to preserve the distinction
between Title X programs and abortion as a method of family plan-
ning.' "188 The Court also found that the Secretary made the determi-
nation "that the new regulations [were] more in keeping with the
original intent of the statute, [were] justified by client experience
under the prior policy, and ... . [were] supported by a shift in attitude
against the 'elimination of unborn children by abortion.' "189 The
Court held that "these justifications [were] sufficient to support the
Secretary's revised approach."1 90
E. INS v. Elias-Zacarias
Since Chang, federal courts, with the exception of Guo Chun Di,
have considered the propriety of the Board's decision in light of tradi-
tional judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of its own stat-
182 1d at 186 (quoting Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 862 (1984)).
183 Id at 177-78.
184 Id. at 186 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 20, id. (No. 89-1392).
185 Id
186 Id (citing Chew'on, 467 U.S. at 862-64 (holding that a revised agency interpretation
deserves deference because "(a]n initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in
stone" and "the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpreta-
tions and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis")); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n
of United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (stating that an
agency is not required to "establish rules of conduct to last forever," (quoting American
Trucking Assn's, Inc. v. Atchinson, T. & S.F.R. Co., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967)), but rather
"must be given ample latitude to 'adapt [its] rules and policies to the demands of changing
circumstances.'" (quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784 (1968))).
187 Rust, 500 U.S. at 187 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 42.)





ute.19 1 Thus, these courts have upheld the Board's policy absent a
showing that it is an unreasonable interpretation. 192 All of the courts,
again, with the exception of the court in Guo Chun Di, have deter-
mined that the Board's decision in Chang was not unreasonable. 193
The Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias'94 is often cited
as support for this determination.1 9 5
In Elias-Zacarias, the Supreme Court denied asylum eligibility for a
Guatemalan native who had fled his country because of a guerrilla or-
ganization's attempt to conscript him into military service.1 9 6 The
Court understood the ordinary meaning of the phrase "persecution on
account of ... political opinion" in Section 1101 (a) (42) (A) to be lim-
ited to "persecution on account of the victim's political opinion, not
the persecutor's." 9 7 "Thus," the Court reasoned, "the mere existence
of a generalized 'political' motive underlying the guerrillas' forced re-
cruitment [was] inadequate to establish... the proposition that Elias-
Zacarias fear[ed] persecution on account of political opinion," as Sec-
tion 1101(a) (42) (A) required.' 98 Rather, the Court required that
"since the statute makes motive critical," 199 aliens seeking asylum must
prove that they were persecuted for their political opinion, rather than
for some other reason not enumerated by the Act.20 0
The principle of Elias-Zacarias is that when determining whether
an alien fears persecution on account of his or her political opinion,
the Act requires courts to focus on the motive of the persecutor and
191 Wang v. Slattery, No. 94 CIV 3489 (CSH) 1995 WL 46332, at *10 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(stating that because the court had concluded that the Board's decision in Chang was entitled
to deference, "it [was] not for [the court] to determine de novo whether the desire to have
more children manifested by the act of procreation constitutes a political opinion"); See supra
notes 154-90 and accompanying text.
192 See, e.g., Wang, 1995 WL 46332, at *8; Dong v. Slattery, 870 F. Supp. 53, 56 (S.D.N.Y.
1994); Gao v. Waters, 869 F. Supp. 1474, 1481 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Si v. Slattery, 864 F. Supp.
397, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
193 See, e.g., Wang, 1995 WL 46332, at *8; Dong, 870 F. Supp. at 57-58; Gao, 869 F. Supp. at
1481; Si, 864 F. Supp. at 405; Chen v. Slattery, 862 F. Supp. 814, 820-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
194 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
195 See, e.g., Wang, 1995 WL 46332, at *8; Dong, 870 F. Supp. at 57-58; Gao, 869 F. Supp. at
1481; Si, 864 F. Supp. at 405; Chen, 862 F. Supp. at 820-21.
196 Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 480.
197 Id. at 482. By analogy the court notes that "[i f a Nazi regime persecutes Jews, it is
not, within the ordinary meaning of language, engaging in persecution on account of polit-
ical opinion .... " Id.
198 Id See Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1029 (2d Cir. 1994) (interpreting Elias-Zacarias).
The court in Osorio interpreted this requirement to mean that "the persecutor's political
motive is insufficient to infer the relevant causal connection, persecution on account of the
victim's political opinion." Id.
199 Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 480. The Court noted that applicants need not necessarily
provide direct proof of their persecutors' motives, but that they must provide some evidence
of it, either direct or circumstantial. Id.
200 Id at 483 & n.2.; Osorio, 18 F.3d at 102. The Court in Elias-Zacarias determined that
Elias-Zacarias would be persecuted for his refusal to fight and not for his political opinion.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483.
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the belief of the victim.20 1 Courts evaluating Chang in light of Elias-
Zacarias have found the Board's decision consistent with this princi-
ple.202 The Board in Chang asserted that the PRC's population policy
had an objectively legitimate and nonpolitical goal of controlling pop-
ulation growth.203 The Board also implicitly held that opposition to
the PRC's policy manifested by a desire to have more children was not
a political opinion.20 4 Courts have thus concluded that the Board's
interpretation is consistent with the statute because it focuses upon the
political belief of the victim and the motivation of the alleged
persecutor. 20 5
IV. Analysis
The court's conclusion in Guo Chun Di that judicial deference to
the Board's decision in Changwas inappropriate conforms with the law
on judicial deference in response to administrative inconsistency. Lan-
guage in the Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca sup-
ports the determination that judicial deference to a decision by the
BIA is unwarranted where the decision represents one of many con-
flicting agency pronouncements on the issue. 206 However, the incon-
sistencies in agency interpretation relied upon by the court in Guo
Chun Di v. Carroll are distinguishable in one important respect from
those present in Cardoza-Fonseca In Guo Chun Di, the government cor-
rectly pointed out that the BIA, "which is the highest administrative
tribunal empowered to conduct deportation proceedings, has acted
consistently and designated Chang as the precedent applicable to all
cases involving asylum claims on opposition to a country's coercive
family planning policies. '20 7 The court in Guo Chun Di relied upon the
contradictory pronouncements of the several Attorneys General, the
President and INS in order to show agency inconsistency on the is-
201 See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482-83. Elias-Zacarias does not require that a victim nec-
essarily hold the belief for which he faces persecution if he can adequately prove that his
persecutors have imputed to him such political opinion. Id. at 482. See also, Canas-Segovia v.
INS, 970 F.2d 599, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Imputed political opinion is still a valid basis for
relief after Elias-Zacarias."); Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[W]hether
the political opinion is actually held or implied makes little difference where the alien's life is
equally at risk."); Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 517 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[I]t is irrele-
vant whether a victim actually possesses any of these opinions as long as the government
believes that he does."); Dong v. Slattery, 870 F. Supp. 53, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
202 See, e.g., Wang v. Slattery, 1995 WL 46332, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Dong, 870 F. Supp. at
57-58; Gao v. Waters, 869 F. Supp. 1474, 1481 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Si v. Slattery, 864 F. Supp.
397, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Chen v. Slattery, 862 F. Supp. 814, 820-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Matter
of G, Int. Dec. 3215 (BIA 1993).
203 Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989).
204 Wang, 1995 WL 46332, at *4-5.
205 See, e.g., Wang, 1995 WL 46332, *8; Dong, 870 F. Supp. at 57-58; Gao, 869 F. Supp. at
1481; Si, 864 F. Supp. at 405; Chen, 862 F. Supp. at 820-21; Matter of G, Int. Dec. 3215.




7 Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 867 (E.D. Va. 1994).
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sue.20 In Cardoza-Fonseca, however, the BIA itself had issued contradic-
tory rulings on the question of the relationship between the standards
of proof necessary for refugee status and for withholding of
deportation. 20 9
The court in Guo Chun Di v. Carroll finds more direct support for
its action by analogizing the administrative inconsistency in the case to
the inconsistency in Wilcox v. Ives.210 Similar to the situation presented
in Guo Chun Di, the administrative inconsistencies at issue in Wilcox
were the conflicting pronouncements of the executive officers directly
responsible for promulgating regulations to enforce the statute whose
interpretation was in question. 211 In addition, the court in Wilcox did
not consider it relevant that one of those conflicting pronouncements
was contained in a proposed amendment to the regulation that was
subsequently withdrawn prior to publication. 212
Of the numerous federal district court decisions contemporane-
ous with Guo Chun Di v. Carroll that address the issue of whether Chang
is entitled to judicial deference, the court in Guo Chun Di is the only
one that has ruled that it is not.2 13 For the most part, however, these
courts have concentrated solely on the question of whether any of the
administrative pronouncements that are contrary to Chang ever had
legal effect.2 14 As such, these decisions are inapposite to Guo Chun D's
208 Id. at 866-67 (listing the various pronouncements). See also supra notes 119-53 and
accompanying text.
209 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 447 n.30. However, in the course of discussing the
agency's inconsistency, the Court noted that at one time the INS was instructing its officials
to apply a standard that was at odds with BIA precedent. Id. (citing Matter of Dunar, 14 I. &
N. Dec. 310 (BIA 1973) and DrPT. OF JUSTICE, INS OPERATING INSTIRUCTIONS REcULATiONS
TM 100, § 208.4, at 766.9) (Nov. 11, 1981)); cf supra notes 142-45 (discussing INS's position
that refugee status was appropriate for aliens fleeing PRC's coercive population control prac-
tices despite decision in Chang).
210 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 870 n.24 (citing Wilcox v. Ives, 864 F.2d 915 (1st Cir.
1988)).
211 Supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
212 See Wilcox, 864 F.2d at 922-23 (discussing the conflicting regulations but making no
differentiation between proposed and actual regulations).
213 See, e.g., Wang v. Slattery, 1995 WL 46332, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that Chang
was still in force and entitled to considerable deference); accord Dong v. Slattery, 870 F. Supp.
53, 56-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Gao v. Waters, 869 F. Supp. 1474, 1481 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Si v.
Slattery, 864 F. Supp. 397, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Chen v. Slattery, 862 F. Supp. 814, 820-21
(E.D.N.Y. 1994).
Indeed, two ofJudge Ellis' fellow Eastern District of VirginiaJudges have ruled the other
way since Guo Chun Di v. Carroll was handed down. See Li Zhi Guan v. Carroll, Civ. A No. 94-
410-A, 13 (E.D. Va. May 13, 1994) ("I reach the same issue [as in Guo Chun Dil and, with
respect, I come to a different conclusion.") (bench decision); Chen v. Carroll, 866 F. Supp.
283, 285 (E.D. Va. 1994) (Brinkema, J.).
But see Xin-Chang v. Slattery, 859 F. Supp. 708, 712-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that
January 1993 Rule became effective despite being unpublished and that BIA was required to
apply the standard mandated thereby).
214 See, e.g, Wang, 1995 WL 46332, at *3-7 (holding that the January 1990 Interim Rule,
1990 Executive Order and theJanuary 1993 Rule did not invalidate Chang); Gao, 869 F. Supp.
at 1480 ("While legislative and executive events subsequent to Chang have shaken its founda-
tion they have not brought the decision down."); Si, 864 F. Supp. at 401-04 (holding that the
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ruling that the culmination of these inconsistent pronouncements,
rather than the actual legal effect of any particular one,215 creates the
"cacophony of administrative voices" that makes judicial deference
inappropriate.2 16
Where the specific issue of diminished judicial deference due to
administrative inconsistency has been addressed by these courts, it has
generally been dismissed with little analysis.217 The district court in
Wang v. Slattery noted that "[w]hile it is readily apparent that various
arms from time to time made inconsistent pronouncements concern-
ing the policy to be followed, the only consistent policy which has in
fact been applied is the Chang decision ... ,"21 This statement by the
court cannot be reconciled with the history of administrative policy
regarding the refugee status of PRC nationals seeking asylum due to
coercive family planning practices. First, three Attorneys General have
issued regulations that were directly contrary to the Board's decision in
Chang.21 9 Second, the Board's refusal in Chang to follow the guide-
lines issued by Attorney General Meese, because "the[ ] guidelines...
were directed to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, rather
than the immigration judges and this Board,"2 20 indicates that the BIA
and INS, though both departments within the DOJ, applied different
standards.22 1 Third, the decision in Changwas apparently not the pol-
icy of the agency during the seven months that the January 1990 In-
terim Rule was in effect.2 2 2 Finally, while the BIA may have
consistently applied the standard in Chang, immigration judges have
routinely applied the policy announced in the 1990 Executive Order to
grant asylum to refugees fleeing coercive population control practices
1990 Executive Order andjanuary 1993 Rule did not invalidate Chang); Chen v. Carroll, 866 F.
Supp. at 286-288 ("Even without giving the appropriate deference to the Board's determina-
tion, this Court would find that Chang is valid legal authority."); Chen v. Slattery, 862 F. Supp.
at 821-23 (holding that neither the January 1990 Interim Rule, the 1990 Executive Order,
nor January 1993 Rule overruled Chang).
215 Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 866-70 (E.D. Va. 1994); see also Wilcox, 864
F.2d at 922-23. The court in Guo Chun Di conceded that "the status and legal effect of the
[January] 1993 Rule remains unclear." Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 868. However, the court
did not rely upon the validity of the January 1993 Rule in reaching its conclusion regarding
deference. Id. at 868 n.16 ("In the final analysis .... [the] continuing validity of the [Janu-
ary] 1993 Rule need not be resolved in order to decide the case at bar."). Likewise, the court
conceded that the January Interim Rule "likely did not erase or overrule Chang . I..." Id. at
869.
216 See Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 870.
217 See Wang, 1995 WL 46332, at *9 (concluding BIA's decision in Changis reasonable);
Dong, 870 F. Supp. at 58 (brief discussion downplaying inconsistencies); Si, 869 F. Supp. at
405 (Si has not shown Chang to be overruled); Chent v. Carro// 866 F. Supp. at 286 n.3 (discuss-
ing inconsistencies in a footnote).
218 Wang, 1995 WL 46332, at *9; accord Chen v. Carroll 866 F. Supp. at 286 n.3.
219 See supra notes 119-53 and accompanying text.
220 Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989).
221 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 870 n.21; see also supra notes 142-45 (discussing the
position of INS regarding validity of January 1990 Interim Rule).




The court in Dong v. Slattery asserted that "all that the various pro-
nouncements cited in Guo Chun Di suggest is that the legislative and
executive branches studiously abstained from overruling Chang."22
4
This argument ignores the period between January 1990 and July 1990
when the BIA's decision in Chang was presumably overturned by then
Attorney General Thornburgh's January 1990 Interim Rule.22 5 Fur-
thermore, the 1990 Executive Order, despite the fact that it did not
give rise to a private right of action, nonetheless explicitly evinced the
executive branch's determination to overrule Chang.22
6
The district court in Chen v. Slattery incorrectly interpreted the
holdings in Himes v. Shalala and Rust v. Sullivan to require deference to
the BIA's decision in Chang.227 The facts of Himes228 and Rust2 2 9 are
distinguishable from those presented in Chen v. Slattery, and the similar
refugee cases. In Himes, the court found that "because [of] the circum-
stances surrounding" the Secretary of HHS's change of position,
namely, the issuance of a policy ruling by the Federal Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration and New York State's subsequent amendment
to its eligibility rules, the Secretary had provided "sufficient justifica-
tion" for the current policy.2 30 Similarly, in Rust the Court found that
the Secretary's change in position was occasioned by a determination
that the previous policy had failed to enforce the statute.231 The Court
in Rust found it determinative that the Secretary had "amply justified
his change of interpretation with a 'reasoned analysis.' "232
Himes and Rust characterize the challenged inconsistencies as
shifts that were justified responses in light of well-reasoned analyses of
changed circumstances. 233 This characterization does not describe the
inconsistencies in administrative policy regarding aliens seeking asy-
223 See, e.g., Letter from Grover Rees, Former General Counsel of the Immigration and
Nationalization Service, to the Hon. Jesse Helms, U.S. Senator (R-N.C.) (Jan. 27, 1994)
(hereinafter Rees Letter] reprinted in 140 CONG. REc. S492-01, 518 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1994)
(noting a total of 654 grants of asylum in 1992 to PRC nationals asserting claims of persecu-
tion based upon resistence to the population control program).
224 Dong v. Slattery, 870 F. Supp. 53, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). The court in Dong stated that
this conclusion was "all the more compelling when one considers that the Attorney General
has the express authority to formally review any BIA decision . Id. (citing 8 C.F.R.
§ 3.1(h)(1)(i) (1994)).
225 See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text (discussing the January 1990 Interim
Rule).
226 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
227 Chen v. Slattery, 862 F. Supp. 814, 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); accord Wang v. Slattery, 1995
WL 46332, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Dong, 870 F. Supp. at 57-58; Gao v. Waters, 869 F. Supp.
1474, 1481 (N.D. Ca. 1994); Si v. Slattery, 864 F. Supp. 397, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
228 See supra note 180.
229 See supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text.
230 Himes v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 684, 690 (2d Cir. 1993).
231 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1991).
232 Id. (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)).
233 Rust, 500 U.S. at 186-87; Himes, 999 F.2d at 690.
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lum in response to the PRC's coercive fariily planning practices. To
the contrary, there is a conspicuous lack of justification for the incon-
sistencies. The Board in Chang did not justify its disregard of Attorney
General Meese's policy guidelines except to say that it was not bound
to adhere to them.234 The January 1990 Interim Rule was superseded
and ostensibly repealed by the July 1990 Rule without so much as a
reference. 23 5 The January 1993 Rule was removed from the office of
the Federal Register three days prior to publication, again without any
stated policy justification. 236 And finally, Attorney General Reno ex-
pressly declined to either resolve or justify the continuing inconsis-
tency that exists between the 1990 Executive Order and the Board's
decision in Chang.237 Therefore, contrary to the court's decision in
Chen v. Slattery, the holdings in Himes and Rust compel the conclusion
that judicial deference to the BIA's decision in Chang is not merited in
the absence of a well-reasoned justification for the administrative in-
consistency presented by the regulatory history.
The BIA's ruling in Matter of Chang, deprived of the trappings of
judicial deference, is revealed by the court in Guo Chun Di to be disin-
genuous to the plain meaning of the Refugee Act.2 38 The Board's rea-
soning in Matter of Chang was incomplete. It concluded that the
abrogation of an alien's fundamental right was not persecution be-
cause disregard of human rights, per se, was not one of the enumer-
ated reasons under the Act. 239 What the Board failed to adequately
address was whether opposition to a country's policy of infringing the
fundamental right to procreate was a form of political opinion. If such
opposition constituted political opinion, then an alien's persecution
for manifesting that opinion should have qualified him for refugee
status.
240
The Board did off-handedly remark that aliens who show that
"they are opposed to the policy [of coercive population control], but
were subjected to it anyway, have [not] demonstrated that they are be-
ing 'punished' for their opinions."241 Rather, according to the Board,
the alien would have to show "evidence of disparate, more severe treat-
ment for those who publicly oppose the policy."2 4
2
This spurious requirement, however, was not supported by any
234 See Matter of Chang, Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989).
235 See 55 Fed. Reg. 30,674 (1990).
236 See Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 864 (E.D. Va. 1994).
237 See Att'y Gen. Order No. 1756-93 (June 29, 1993).
238 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 871-73.
239 See Matter of Chang, int. Dec. 3107 (BIA 1989).
240 See Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 871-73.
241 Chang, Int. Dec. 3107.
242 I&; accord Matter of G, Int. Dec. 3215 (BIA 1993) (denying asylum eligibility because
applicant failed to show how he had been treated any more severely than others who had
violated the population policy).
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language in the Act.2 43 Nothing in the Act precludes asylum to an
alien persecuted because of his political opposition to a governmental
policy that was uniformly applied. 244 In fact, this requirement was dis-
ingenuous to the purpose of the Act. As the court in Guo Chun Di
pointed out,
the uniformly applied policy of most totalitarian governments (e.g.
Cuba and the former Soviet Union and its satellites) is to persecute all
who disagree with the government's legitimacy, or who seek to replace
the government by democratic means. Yet citizens in this category
have always been beneficiaries of asylum under Section
1101 (a) (42) (A).245
Thus the Board's decision in Chang failed to provide a reasonable
justification for why an alien who has been persecuted for his opposi-
tion to his country's policy of forced sterilization does not qualify as a
refugee eligible for asylum under the Act.
Furthermore, courts' subsequent reliance on the principle of
Elias-Zacarias to validate Chang has been misguided. This conclusion
arises from a misconception of the PRC's population control policy.246
These courts have ignored the persecutor's view of birth activity that
not only gives the background necessary to understand the dispute
leading to the persecution, but also provides evidence of the victim's
political beliefs.247
In light of the political nature of the PRC's attitude toward popu-
lation control,248 those who manifest their opposition to coercive fam-
ily planning measures face persecution on account of their political
beliefs. In the PRC, a couple's decision to have more than one child is
viewed as a direct affront to the legitimacy of the power of that govern-
ment over its citizenry.2 49 Not only does the government view such
opposition as politically subversive, but efforts to enforce the policy in
the face of opposition are considered necessary to the maintenance of
totalitarian rule.25 0 The expression of the desire to have more than
one child despite the potential repercussions is an act of defiance that
strikes at the heart of a fundamental party policy and is thus necessarily
an expression of political opinion.251 Refugee law does not require
243 Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 871 n.29.
244 l&
245 Id
246 See supra notes 93-108 and accompanying text.
247 See Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1030 (2nd Cir. 1994) (criticizing the BIA for "ignor-
ing the underlying political context of the dispute" in the Board's misapplication of the Elias-
Zacarias motive principle).
248 See supra notes 93-108 and accompanying text.
249 See supra note 104.
250 "We must expose and deal resolute blows at class enemies who sabotage planned
parenthood." Foreign Broadcast Informational Serv. Daily Rep. - P.RC., Vol I, 152, Aug. 7,
1978, at G4.
251 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text; see also 140 CONG. Rac. S517-02 (daily
ed. Feb. 1, 1994) (statement of Sen. Helms) ("There is an extremely strong case that people
facing persecution for resistance to the coercive population control programs are refugees
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that victims of persecution be politicians, only that they have been per-
secuted for their political beliefs. 252 It seems clear that persons fleeing
persecution resulting from their opposition to the PRC's coercive fam-
ily planning measures have met the Elias-Zacarias motive requirement
for asylum on "political opinion" grounds.
Unlike the applicant seeking asylum in Chang, Mr. Guo Was not
challenging the mere implementation of the PRC's 'one couple, one
child' policy. Rather, "he [was] contending that his opposition to the
policy... led to a situation where the government directly persecuted
him and his family as a result of his opposition to the policy."25 3 The
court's decision in Guo Chun Di convincingly demonstrates that a faith-
ful interpretation of the Act leads to the conclusion that an alien flee-
ing such persecution qualifies for refugee status.
V. Conclusion
The District Court's decision in Guo Chun Di v. Carroll is not bind-
ing precedent for future decisions by the BIA. To this day, the BIA
continues to adhere to its decision in Matter of Chang.254 Since Guo
Chun Di was decided in January 1994, numerous other challenges to
the Board's reliance upon Chang have been brought in both Federal
District Court and the United States Court of Appeals in various cir-
cuits.2 55 Almost without exception, these challenges have failed. 256
Nonetheless, the decision in Guo Chun Di has far-reaching implica-
tions. The decision provides a sensible alternative analysis of the defi-
nition of "refugee," enabling the Board to overturn its decision in
Chang.25 7 The court's decision in Guo Chun Di exposes the Board's
imprudent determination that a Chinese national's choice to have
more than one child is not political. The court correctly characterizes
the fundamental right to procreate and the expression of one's opin-
ions regarding that right as inherently political. This conclusion seems
within the definition of the act. The PRC regime treats these people not as ordinary law-
breakers but as its political and ideological enemies.")
252 Osorio, 18 F.3d at 1030.
253 Id. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
254 See, e.g., Matter of G, Int. Dec. 3215 (BIA 1993) (applying Chang in denying PRC
residents asylum based on opposition to coercive family planning practices). Accord Matter of
Tsun, A 71 824 320 (BIA June 17, 1993); Matter of Chu, A 71 824 281 (BIA June 7, 1993).
255 See supra note 202 and the cases cited therein.
256 See supra note 202 and the cases cited therein. But cf Xin-Chang v. Slattery, 859 F.
Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting habeas relief and holding that the Board should have
applied the unpublished January 1993 Rule interpreting "refugee").
257 There is some indication that immigration judges have already taken the lead in this
respect. According to a report in the New York Times in May of 1994, Immigration Judge
Alan Vomacka granted three Chinese men, each the father of two children in China, relief
from deportation due to their fear of persecution resulting from the PRC's population con-
trol policy. Robert McFadden, Three Smuggled Refugees Are Granted Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
1994, at A27. The three men were believed to be the first from the Golden Venture to win
asylum from an immigration judge on the grounds of China's family planning measures. Id.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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obvious considering the political polarization that has occurred over
abortion in American society. When considered in light of the PRC's
coercive population control measures, however, the conclusion seems
inescapable. The BIA and immigration judges should recognize this
reality when evaluating asylum claims by Chinese nationals and ac-
knowledge that persons are persecuted under the PRC's policy be-
cause of their political opinion and thus are eligible for consideration
as refugees under the Act.
Failure by the BIA to follow the lead of the court in Guo Chun Di
may convince Congress to act legislatively to correct Board policy that
is contrary to the intent of the Refugee Act. 258 Adoption of this posi-
tion would not equate to wholesale asylum for all Chinese nationals
claiming persecution resulting from the PRC's coercive population
control program. Aliens seeking asylum on this basis would still be
required to prove that: (1) they in fact had been persecuted or pos-
sessed a well-founded fear of persecution; (2) they made an overt man-
ifestation of their opposition to coercive family planning; and (3) the
persecution was because of this opposition and not some other reason
not protected by the Act.259 Furthermore, after a determination that
an applicant has made the requisite showing in order to qualify as a
refugee under the Act, the Attorney General still must decide as a mat-
ter of discretion whether or not to grant asylum.2 60 The adoption of
the definition of refugee expressed in Guo Chun Di would not open the
proverbial floodgates to Chinese applicants who claim a fear of perse-
cution as a result of the PRC's coercive population control practices. 261
Rather, recognition that these are legitimate political refugees would
simply allow them to be considered for asylum on terms equal to those
imposed upon other refugees that arrive on our nation's shores.
In addition, Guo Chun Di is an example of a well-reasoned decision
that calls into question the assumptions and conclusions in the multi-
258 An attempt was made to do just that during the 1994 session of Congress. Senator
Jesse Helms (R-NC) introduced an amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
For The Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, S. 1281, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), the purpose of
which was to "provide relief from exclusion and/or deportation . . . to persons who can show
that they have a well founded fear of persecution for refusal to submit to forced abortion or
sterilization under the coercive population control program" of the PRC. 140 CONG. Rac.
S517 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1994). The bill along with the amendment passed the Senate; how-
ever the corresponding House bill contained no corollary amendment and the Conference
Committee adopted the House perspective. H.R. CONF. RE'. No. 482, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
559 (1994).
259 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (A) (1988); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481-83 (1992).
260 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1988). As former INS General Counsel Joseph Rees points out
"[i t is also important to remember that several thousand applications during a year typically
result in only a few hundred actual grants of asylum during the year." Rees Letter, supra note
223.
261 The reported 6,500 Chinese nationals who sought asylum on this basis in 1993 was
"hardly the 'floodgate' that opponents of refugee status were predicting earlier in the year. It
is a tiny fraction of the many thousands of asylum applications received during the year ......
Rees Letter, supra note 223.
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tude of contrary contemporary decisions. The court's analysis with-
stands scrutiny and provides a legitimate means for reviewing courts to
set aside traditional judicial deference to the Board's interpretation of
the Refugee Act and to examine the continued legitimacy of Chang.
The legislative history related in Guo Chun Di reveals the politicization
that can occur when Congress vests authority in an agency to interpret
and enforce a statute. Judicial deference to inconsistent agency inter-
pretation risks "a scheme of statutory construction based not on a gov-
ernment of laws, but rather on a government of 'who was most recently
elected.' ",262
In particular, the executive branch has faced repeated criticism
for its use of immigration policy to clandestinely further foreign and
domestic policy, as well as ideological objectives.2 63 The adoption of
the Refugee Act of 1980 was a recognition of this country's moral re-
sponsibility to admit, as refugees, persons fleeing specified types of per-
secution without discrimination as to their country of origin or
personal beliefs. Nonetheless, grants of asylum have flowed almost ex-
clusively to persons fleeing countries with which the United States has
hostile relations.2 64 Likewise, the exclusion policy regarding homosex-
uals seeking asylum that was in effect until the passage of the Immigra-
tion Act of 1990 further exemplifies how political and moral
judgments can corrupt what is meant to be an ideologically neutral
determination as to refugee status.
2 65
It is unlikely that mere coincidence adequately explains why the
Bush administration sought to facilitate the immigration of Chinese
nationals fleeing persecution at a time when television viewers were
262 Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 866 (E.D. Va. 1994).
263 Norman and Naomi Zucker observe:
The major provisions of the Refugee Act - ideologically neutral admissions
and a fair asylum policy - were never implemented. The admission of refu-
gees and the granting of asylum have been bent to the exigencies of foreign
policy, public pressure and budget restraints.... Thus, the Congress, despite
its intentions, created a monster when it provided for the granting of asylum:
the asylum apparatus has the body of a border patrol officer and the mind of a
foreign policy bureaucrat.
Norman Zucker & Naomi Zucker, The 1980 Refugee Act: A 1990 Perspective, in REFUGEE POLICY.
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 240-41 (Howard Adelman ed., 1991). See also AMNESTY IN-
TERNATIONAL, U.S.A, REASONABLE FEAR: HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNrIED STATES REFUGEE POLICY 2
(1990) (criticizing the U.S. Government for having "broken the promise of the 1980 Refugee
Act" by discriminating on the basis of nationality).
264 "From the 1950's until 1989, United States asylum policy could be reduced to a sim-
ple maxim: Cuba, yes, Haiti, no. People fleeing Communist dictatorships had an open door;
people fleeing right-wing regimes did not." Tim Weiner, Smuggled To New York; Fixing Immi-
gration, N.Y. TimS, June 8, 1993, at B2. See Zucker & Zucker, supra note 263, at 240-41 (list-
ing statistics for asylum approvals by district directors from 1983 to 1989, ranging from a high
of 72.6% for persons from the U.S.S.R. to a low of 2.0% for Guatemalans).
265 See RobertJ. Foss, The Demise of the Homosexual Exclusion: New Possibilities For Gay and
Lesbian Immigration, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 439 (1994), for a postmodernist discussion of
the various socio-political factors that conspired in the enactment and enforcement of the
language that excluded homosexuals.
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horrified by scenes of the Tiananmen Square massacre. 266 Similarly,
in light of the progress that President Clinton has made toward rees-
tablishing friendly diplomatic and trade relations with China, it is not
surprising that the administration does not wish to address the poten-
tially embarrassing issue of China's coercive population control prac-
tices.2 67, Domestic policy considerations have probably also played a
part in both administrations' choices of action. President Bush's polit-
ical alliance with the anti-abortion movement necessitated a strong re-
action towards any population control program that included
government sponsored abortion, whether coerced or not.268 President
Clinton had to be concerned with appearing to "open the flood gates"
of potential Chinese refugees in light of American voters' growing re-
sentment toward immigrants.2 69
Ironically, the adoption of the Chinese Exclusion Act marked the
beginning of political intrusion into immigration policy. 270 It is clear
that the practice continues to thrive at the expense of Chinese persons
seeking to relocate to the United States. The story beneath the surface
of the court's decision in Guo Chun Di is that under the current imple-
mentation of the Refugee Act, through capricious agency interpreta-
tion glossed with judicial deference, people who legitimately deserve
the protection afforded by our laws are routinely sacrificed as pawns in
a political game.
JAMES M. WINES
266 The Armstrong-DeConcini Amendment was introduced as an amendment to the
Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989, a bill designed to offer various safe-
guards to Chinese students residing in the United States in light of the Tiananmen Square
Massacre. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text. President Bush also announced his
intention to implement the policy of the Amendment despite vetoing the bill in a release that
denounced the Chinese government for its actions during the June 1989 student uprising.
See Memorandum of Disapproval, supra note 133.
267 Despite the PRC's failure to satisfy certain human rights conditions, President Clin-
ton renewed most-favored-trade status for China in May 1994. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,103 (1994).
See Clinton Reverses China MFN Policy: Mitchell To Introduce China Measure, 11 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 22, at 844 (June 1, 1994); China Says US. Move On MFN Creates 'Historic Opportu-
nity' For Better Ties, 11 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 844 (June 1, 1994).
268 "What you have is an ideological decision made by the Bush and Reagan Administra-
tions based on their attitudes toward population control and politics." Weiner, supra note
264 (quoting George High, Executive Director of the Center for Immigration Studies).
269 In response to this political pressure, both the House of Representatives and the
Senate intiroduced restrictive immigration reform legislation in the early days of the 104th
Congress. 141 CONG. REc. El (daily ed.Jan. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Stump); 141 CONG.
REc. S1453 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Simpson).
270 See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
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